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We measured sensitivity and timeliness of a syndromic
surveillance system to detect bioterrorism events. A hypo-
thetical anthrax release was modeled by using zip code
population data, mall customer surveys, and membership
information from HealthPartners Medical Group, which cov-
ers 9% of a metropolitan area population in Minnesota. For
each infection level, 1,000 releases were simulated. Timing
of increases in use of medical care was based on data from
the Sverdlovsk, Russia, anthrax release. Cases from the
simulated outbreak were added to actual respiratory visits
recorded for those dates in HealthPartners Medical Group
data. Analysis was done by using the space-time scan sta-
tistic. We evaluated the proportion of attacks detected at
different attack rates and timeliness to detection. Time-
liness and completeness of detection of events varied by
rate of infection. First detection of events ranged from days
3 to 6. Similar modeling may be possible with other surveil-
lance systems and should be a part of their evaluation.
N
umerous syndromic surveillance systems are in place
to detect potential bioterrorism events, and all of them
have common components: a nonspecific indicator of dis-
ease available in near real time for a definable population,
a means of generating the expected counts for each day of
the year (accounting for day of week and seasonal variabil-
ity), a detection algorithm, a defined threshold for action,
and a system to investigate a signal. Assessing the sensitiv-
ity and timeliness of these systems has been difficult.
Because of the lack of real events, modeling of hypotheti-
cal events is necessary to assess the performance of these
systems. Although existing systems can be assessed by
using naturally occurring illness events such as the begin-
ning of the influenza season each year or gastrointestinal
outbreaks, this assessment provides little information as to
how well these systems will detect the release of a bioter-
rorism agent such as anthrax. Buehler et al. (1), Sosin and
de Thomasis (2), and Reingold (3) have called for addi-
tional assessment of syndromic surveillance systems.
The existing literature on the ability of syndromic sur-
veillance systems is sparse. Mandl et al. used a purely tem-
poral approach with real background data and simulated
spiked outbreaks (4). They described a variety of ways to
design the spiked data, including specifically using data
from the Russian anthrax release in 1979 (5). They
describe 4 steps in detection: grouping data into syn-
dromes; the modeling stage, in which historic data are
studied to understand temporal trends; the detection stage,
in which predictions based on the modeling are compared
with observed data and deviations of data from expecta-
tions are used to set off alarms; and the threshold stage, in
which the health department determines if the outbreak is
worth investigation. Buckeridge et al. describe a complex
model to produce a realistic space-time simulation of
spiked outbreaks of anthrax superimposed on real back-
ground data (6). Their model of a simulated event has 4
stages: agent dispersal, infection, disease and behavior,
and data source. Kulldorff et al. produced a testing data set
with simulated space-time outbreaks and simulated back-
ground data (7). Within these data sets, positive predictive
value, sensitivity, and specificity can be evaluated for a
variety of testing systems that analyze both purely tempo-
ral and temporal-spatial aspects of outbreaks.
None of these efforts has used a functioning system to
analyze how effective it would be at detecting a biological
attack. This article presents the first attempt to evaluate the
performance of an operational syndromic surveillance
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rigorous manner and provides a useful construct for other
systems to follow. Acomparison of our methods with those
used in previous bioterrorism surveillance assessments is
shown in Table 1.
Methods
This syndromic surveillance system is part of the
National Syndromic Surveillance System (8,9). This cur-
rent investigation is based on existing historic use data
contributed by the HealthPartners Medical Group
(HPMG). We assumed that anthrax spores were released
into one of the air intakes of the Mall of America in
Bloomington, Minnesota, and then dispersed by the venti-
lation system, which provided a uniform exposure
throughout the mall. Modeled visits of patients with respi-
ratory symptoms were produced by using 3 factors: demo-
graphic data from the mall, demographic data on HPMG
patients, and data on time to symptom onset from the
anthrax outbreak in Sverdlovsk (5). Historic data were
used to add the number of respiratory cases that would be
expected under ordinary conditions. Finally, the detection
sensitivity and timeliness of the system were analyzed.
Syndromic Surveillance Data
HPMG provides medical care in 20 clinics to ≈250,000
patients, or ≈9% of the total population in the
Minneapolis-St. Paul, Minnesota metropolitan area. It uses
an electronic medical record that captures in real time
nearly all physician visits and makes them accessible at the
end of each day. Each evening, the data system is queried
to obtain all visits for respiratory symptoms for that day.
Respiratory symptoms were used to build the model for
this simulation. One year of this dataset, from July 1, 2003,
through June 30, 2004, was used to test this project. We
had 2.5 years of earlier data, which allowed us to establish
the number of visits that would ordinarily be expected. 
Anthrax Simulation Model
The number and geographic distribution of patients
with anthrax were modeled by using visitor data from the
mall, the US Census bureau (http://www.census.gov/
geo/www/gazetteer/places2k.html), and demographic data
from HPMG. We purposely chose to model the first 3
stages of infection of Buckeridge et al. (6) (agent disper-
sion, infection, and disease and behavior) as a simple rate
of visits for respiratory illness because those data were
available from the Sverdlovsk outbreak, and they produced
a simpler model. Keeping the model simple is initially
important to allow the basic relationships between the vari-
ables to be understood. The rate of physician visits for res-
piratory symptoms ranged from 4% to 100% of the visitors
to the mall that day. The specific rates for which models
were run were as follows: 4%, 8%, 12%, 16%, 20%, 40%,
60%, and 100%.
The Sverdlovsk outbreak generated no physician visits
on day 1; the number of visits increased until day 9 and
then decreased. We created a cumulative distribution of the
probability of a visit for respiratory symptoms each day
from day 0 to day 30. We did not run the simulation
beyond day 30 because detecting an outbreak with our sys-
tem would not be beneficial at that point. To prevent a con-
tinuous signal pattern, we introduced variation by using a
Poisson distribution consistent with the cumulative distri-
bution. This distribution simulates the natural variation
that would be expected in such scenarios.
We used the following approach. First, we created a
cumulative distribution of the respiratory visits expected
each day from 1 through 30. For example, the cumulative
distribution was 0.0 for day 1, 0.01 (0.00 + 0.01) for day 2,
0.03 (0.00 + 0.01 + 0.02) for day 3, etc. Second, we
assigned a random number from 0.0 to 1.0 from a uniform
distribution as each randomly created day for the number of
infections. Third, if the random number generated was
between the minimum cumulative range for a day and the
maximum cumulative range for a day, we then produced a
new visit from the infection. All calculations were rounded
down to the nearest integer. The effect is shown in Table 2,
which shows how many visits occurred during the simula-
tions from 1 zip code on day 6. Of the 1,000 simulations, no
visits occur 123 times on day 6. Four times, however, 8 vis-
its occur. Most of the time 1, 2, or 3 visits occur on day 6.
Each of the 1,000 simulations at the given infection rate
was randomly assigned (with replacement) to an attack
date. The additional cases were added to the historic data
based on the date randomly chosen for each iteration,
which created 1,000 new files.
The expected number of visits added for a specific
release can be expressed as 
where n = the number of zip codes in the outbreak, mi =
number of mall visitors in zip code i,  hi = number of
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⋅⋅ ∑HealthPartners patients in zip code i, d = infection rate of
the simulation, and popi = population of zip code i. The
actual number of added cases was random and followed
Poisson distribution centered on the expected count.
This equation allows us to vary the infection rate of the
attack and the number of patients from the zip code. With
a limited number of simulations, this variation allows us to
assess the effect of an attack with a variety of infection
rates and rates of HPMG’s penetration in the community
and the zip code.
Release Detection Method
The Poisson-based prospective space-time scan statis-
tic was used to detect releases (10). This method uses a
large number of overlapping cylinders in which the height
of the cylinder represents time and the circular base rep-
resents space in such a way that all zip code areas whose
centroid (the population-weighted geographic center of
the area) is within the circle are included in the cylinder.
Each cylinder represents a candidate area and duration for
a true disease outbreak, and the method adjusts for the
multiple testing inherent in the many cylinders evaluated.
We evaluated all cylinders for which the circle center was
identical to the centroid of one of the zip code areas; for
each circle center the maximum radius of the circle was
set so that <50% of the at-risk population was contained
in the zip codes included within the circle, and the height
of the cylinder was set to be <3 days. Purely temporal
cylinders, including all zip code areas and either 1, 2, or 3
days, were also evaluated. The method needs expected
counts for each day and zip code, and these were deter-
mined on the basis of historical data from January 1, 2001,
to June 30, 2003, by using a generalized linear mixed
modeling approach that accounts for natural seasonal and
weekly variation in the data (11). Analyses were per-
formed by using the freely available SaTScan software
(www.satscan.org).
A signal is detected when the number of episodes of
respiratory illness is substantially greater than expected.
The rarity of an outbreak signal is measured as a recur-
rence interval, which is defined as the expected number of
days of surveillance needed for a signal of at least the
observed magnitude to occur, in the absence of any true
outbreaks, and it is the inverse of the nominal p value from
the space-time scan statistic. Thus, the larger the recur-
rence interval, the more unusual the outbreak signal. We
present results that use recurrence intervals of 3 months (p
= 0.011) and 2 years (p = 0.0013). At the 3-month recur-
rence interval level, ≈4 positive signals will occur per year
by chance, whereas at the 2-year level, only 1 positive sig-
nal expected by chance will occur every 2 years. 
For each simulated attack, the spiked data were ana-
lyzed for each of the 10 days after the attack. We then
report the proportion of all attacks that generated an out-
break signal on or before each of days 2 to 10.
Results
Timeliness and completeness of detection of events
varied by rate of infection and by percentage of population
covered by HPMG. Initial models were done at the current
9% population coverage. At a 40% infection rate and a
recurrence interval of 3 months (p = 0.011), the first events
(outbreaks) were detected on day 2, one fourth by day 6,
three fourths by day 7, and all 1,000 by day 8. With high-
er percentages of infections, all events were detected earli-
er. At an infection rate <40%, not all events were detected.
At a 20% infection rate, 845 of 1,000 events were detect-
ed at a 2-year recurrence interval, and 926 of 1,000 events
were detected at a 3-month recurrence interval (both peak-
ing at day 8). The number of events detected decreases
proportionately as the infection rate decreases from 20% to
4%. At a 4% infection rate little is detected; 7 events are
detected at a 2-year recurrence interval, and 57 events are
detected at a 3-month recurrence interval.
At a 16% infection rate, more events were detected dur-
ing the summer than during the winter, with an intermedi-
ate number of events detected in the fall and spring
(Table 3). The day of release also affected the number of
events detected. When the number of cases peaked on
Saturday or Sunday, more events were detected (Table 4).
The number of days until detection peaked increased as the
rate of infection decreased. 
At infection rates >16%, the relationship of detection to
season was weaker because all events were detected.
However, events are detected more rapidly in the summer
when respiratory conditions are less common. The rela-
tionship of the day of the week with release is more
RESEARCH
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ber of days until all events are detected gets smaller, and
the highest rate of detection occurs closest to the time of
release. Events were best detected when the highest rates
of visits occurred on the weekend. 
The percentage of the population in the area covered by
the surveillance system directly affects the smallest size of
outbreaks that can be reliably detected and the timeliness
of detection of those outbreaks. We also computed system
characteristics if 36% of the population (4 times as much)
were covered by the surveillance system. In this situation,
at a recurrence interval of 3 months (p = 0.011) and an
infection rate of 50%, all events were detected by day 3
and most by day 2. At a 10% infection rate, the first events
were detected on day 2, one fourth by day 6, three fourths
by day 7, and all 1,000 events by day 8.
The extremes of sensitivity and timeliness are shown in
Figures 1 and 2. The first extreme, with a high threshold
and 9% of the population, shows the lowest sensitivity,
while the second extreme, with a low threshold and 36% of
the population, shows high sensitivity. Most configura-
tions would fall somewhere between these 2 extremes.
Discussion
This study has several limitations. Simplifying assump-
tions was crucial to the construction of this simulation and
are both its strength and weakness. We assumed that most
patients would have respiratory symptoms. The first 3
stages of the model of Buckeridge et al. (6) are merged.
The distribution of intervals from exposure to initial obser-
vance of disease we used was based on incubation periods
determined from the Sverdlovsk outbreak in Russia (2).
The inadvertent release of anthrax spores from a mili-
tary microbiology facility in Sverdlovsk, Russia, in 1979 is
the largest documented epidemic of inhalational anthrax
and clearly demonstrates the potential for Bacillus
anthracis to be used as a weapon. In Sverdlovsk, the
spores were likely released on a single day. The incubation
period of anthrax in this outbreak ranged from 2 to 3 days
to slightly more than 6 weeks; the modal incubation peri-
od was 9–10 days. Other investigators have used the
Sverdlovsk data to compute a median incubation period of
11 days (12).
Some patients will likely have initial symptoms only a
few days after the exposure, and their conditions diag-
nosed a few days later. Thus, a suspicious clinician may
detect the first case of anthrax before the surveillance sys-
tem sounds an alarm and public health determines it is an
anthrax release. However, even if the first alarm is sound-
ed by a clinician, these additional data will help define
what is happening and plan a response. This simulation
exercise could be applied to a surveillance system in any
metropolitan area where gathering place is different
enough from residence so that exposed persons would live
far from each other. 
The sensitivity of such a system in detecting small
releases of anthrax depends on the proportion of the popu-
lation covered by the system. The greater the proportion of
the population covered by such a system, the more sensi-
tive it is. According to this model, a system that includes
36% of the population in the area would detect most events
in which >5% of mall shoppers were affected.
Outdoor releases, similar to the outbreak in Sverdlovsk,
have been modeled previously. These models produce
marked geographic clustering, with some spread from per-
sons who pass through the area. In a large regional shop-
ping center that draws people from large areas, detection is
more difficult. Because infected persons live far from each
other, a larger number of cases were needed to detect the
outbreak in our model than in earlier models of outdoor
releases.
The relationship between the days of the week and
detection of events is complex. Fewer patients visit the
clinic on weekends since only 4 urgent-care clinics are
open instead of the usual 20. As the rate of infection
increases, the maximum number of events detected occurs
more quickly. When the maximum number of events
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Figure 1. Cumulative number of releases detected in a recurrence
interval of 2 years (p = 0.0013) with 9% of the population covered.RESEARCH
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detected occurs on weekends, the system is more sensitive.
Thus, as the rate of infection increases, the day of the week
for the release with the most sensitivity shifts closer to the
weekend.
Simulation modeling is necessary to test and prepare
syndromic surveillance systems. Although more complex
simulation modeling can be done, it requires more assump-
tions and may be more sensitive to error because of the
additional risk of false assumptions. 
Conclusions
This article reports the evaluation of an operational
bioterrorism surveillance system. This analysis allows an
understanding of limitations of the system and characteris-
tics unique to the region the surveillance system is moni-
toring. The HPMG bioterrorism surveillance system,
which receives data for ≈9% of the population in the area,
can detect an anthrax release in the Mall of America most
of the time if 20% of the persons at the mall at the time of
release are infected and all of the time at a 40% infection
rate. The time to detection gets progressively shorter as the
infection rate increases >40%. Modeling with 36% popu-
lation coverage showed that such a system would be capa-
ble of detecting a release at a 5% infection rate most of the
time and at a 10% infection rate all the time. Similar mod-
eling may be possible with other surveillance systems and
should be used as a part of their evaluation.
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